The dynamics of US inflation: Can monetary policy explain the changes? by Fabio Canova & Filippo Ferroni
The dynamics of US in°ation: can monetary policy explain
the changes?
Fabio Canova





We investigate the relationship between monetary policy and in°ation dynamics in the
US using a medium scale structural model. The speci¯cation is estimated with Bayesian
techniques and ¯ts the data reasonably well. Policy shocks account for a part of the decline
in in°ation volatility; they have been less e®ective in triggering in°ation responses over
time and qualitatively account for the rise and fall in the level of in°ation. A number of
structural parameter variations contribute to these patterns.
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11 Introduction
The US economy went through a number of important structural changes over the last forty
years. For example, the level of in°ation and of nominal interest rates shows an inverted U-
shaped pattern, rising at the end of the 1970s and falling at the beginning of the 1980s; while
the persistence and the volatility of in°ation dramatically declined since the mid 1980s; see
e.g. Stock and Watson (2002). These patterns are well documented in the literature. What
still is to be determined are the causes of these changes.
The prevailing view suggests that the run-up of in°ation occurred because monetary
authorities believed that there was an exploitable trade-o® between in°ation and output.
Since output was low following the oil shocks of the 1970s, the temptation to in°ate was
strong. However, the option of keeping in°ation temporarily high was unfeasible: in the
medium run, in°ation reached a higher level with output settling at its potential. Since
the 1980s, central banks learned that the output-in°ation trade-o® was not exploitable and
concentrated on the objective of ¯ghting in°ation. A low in°ation regime ensued, and the
larger predictability of monetary policy made the macroeconomic environment less volatile
(see e.g. Sargent (1999), Clarida, et al. (2000), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)). There
are two alternative views to this prevailing wisdom: one focuses on "real" causes (see e.g.
McConnell and Perez Quiroz (2000), Campbell and Herkovitz (2006)) and the other hinges
on "good luck" (see e.g. Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Leeper and Zha (2003), Sims and Zha
(2006)) to explain the changes in the level and in the autocovariance function of in°ation.
One reason for this heterogeneity of explanations is that the empirical strategy used
to study the issue matters. In general, VAR based evidence tends to support the good
luck hypothesis; calibration exercises point to real reasons for the changes; and structural
econometric analyses favor the idea that monetary policy is responsible for the observed
variations (see, e.g. Ireland (2001), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2006)). However, while structural VAR exercises allow for time varying coe±cients and
variances, the evidence produced by more structural calibration or econometric analyses is
mostly restricted to arbitrarily chosen subsamples. Because in°ation and the nominal rate
displayed an inverted U-shaped pattern, subsample evidence may depend on the selected
break point. Fernandez Villaverde and Rubio Ramirez (2008) and Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008) have estimated evolving structural models but their conclusions are only suggestive,
because computational complexities force them to consider variations only in a subset of the
parameters. Given that one expects important covariations in the evolution of structural
parameters, allowing only a subset of the parameters to change may bias inference. Hence,
2it is of interest to know whether less computationally intensive and yet intuitively appealing
structural methods can tell us more about the nature of the changes experienced by US
in°ation.
This paper provides a step in that direction by estimating a structural model over rolling
samples of ¯xed length with Bayesian techniques. Bayesian methods, which have become
popular tools to bring DSGE models to the data thanks to the work of Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) among others, have inferential and compu-
tational advantages over traditional limited and full information classical techniques when
dealing with models which are known to be a misspeci¯ed description of the data. In these
situations, unrestricted classical estimates are often unreasonable or on the boundary of
the parameter space and tricks must be employed to produce economically sensible esti-
mates. Furthermore, asymptotic standard errors attached to classical estimates - which are
constructed assuming that the model is "true" - are meaningless. Rolling samples allow
us to use relatively standard techniques to study the nature of the time variations present
in interesting parameters while maintaining some form of rationality in the economy and
computational costs manageable. For example, relative to Fernandez Villaverde and Rubio
Ramirez (2008), our setup allows the use of Kalman ¯ltering techniques in building the
likelihood function and permits time covariations in all the parameters.
The speci¯cation we consider deviates somewhat from what is standard in the literature
by allowing money to play a role. The stock of money has been neglected in all recent mon-
etary policy discussions (see e.g. Woodford (2003)) and Ireland (2004) provided empirical
evidence supporting this approach. In our setup real balances can potentially a®ect the
Euler equation and the growth rate of nominal balances is allowed to enter the monetary
policy rule. Since we will use loosely speci¯ed but proper priors in the estimation, the
data will decide whether these and other modeling features are important in characterizing
the experience. Overall, the statistical ¯t of the model looks satisfactory, in particular, in
comparison with other structural speci¯cations. We estimate the preferred speci¯cation a
number of times over rolling samples, analyze the time evolution of interesting in°ation
statistics, measure the contribution of monetary policy to the observed changes and study
the evolution of structural parameters.
Our model captures the fall in in°ation volatility over time and part of the changes
can be attributed to monetary policy shocks. We detect level but not shape di®erences
in the transmission of policy shocks which tend to make in°ation less reactive to policy
disturbances as time went by. Finally, variations in the level of in°ation are qualitatively
related to policy shocks: had those been absent, the rise of the 1970s and the fall of 1980s
3would have been much more modest.
A number of structural changes drive these results. We ¯nd support for the conjecture
that the Fed had a much stronger dislike for in°ation but also noticed that in the latest
samples the coe±cient resembles the one obtained at the beginning of the sample. Moreover,
the estimate of the long run coe±cient on monetary aggregates has been steadily declining
over time. In agreement with the good luck hypothesis, we detect variations in the posterior
mean estimate of the variance of the policy shocks. Nevertheless, as in Sims and Zha
(2006), the variations we discover are typically reversed over time. Finally, consistent
with non-monetary explanations of the facts, we also ¯nd that important private sector
parameters such as the slope of the Phillips curves and the costs of adjusting investment
have signi¯cantly changed in the later samples.
In sum, consistent with the conclusions of Gambetti et. al. (2008), we ¯nd that a
combination of causes appears to be responsible for the changes in the level and the auto-
covariance function of US in°ation over the last forty years: changes in the variance of the
shocks, in the parameters regulating private sector behavior and in the policy rule all more
or less contributed to explain why in°ation rose and fell, why in°ation volatility subsided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the estima-
tion technique and the diagnostics used to evaluate the quality of the model's approximation
to the data. Section 3 presents estimation results for the full sample. Section 4 reports the
time pro¯le of in°ation statistics over the rolling samples. Section 5 interprets these time
pro¯les in terms of rolling structural parameter estimates. Section 6 concludes.
2 The framework of analysis
2.1 The Theoretical model
We consider a medium scale model featuring several shocks and frictions. Households
maximize a utility function which depends on three arguments (money, consumption and
leisure), and money and consumption are potentially non-separable. Labor is di®erentiated
over households, so that there is some monopoly over wages which results in an explicit
wage equation. Households allocate wealth among cash and a riskless bond, and bonds
demand is hit by a preference disturbance (as in Smets and Wouters (2007)). Households
also rent capital services to ¯rms and decide how much capital to accumulate. As the
rental price of capital goes up, the capital stock can be used more intensively according
to some schedule cost. There are two types of ¯rms; a ¯nal good representative ¯rm that
aggregates intermediates goods, and a continuoum of intermediate producing ¯rms that
4combine labor and capital in a monopolistic competitive market where price decisions are
subject to a Calvo lottery. Prices that can not be optimally adjusted are assumed to be
partially indexed to past in°ation. Similarly, in the labor market unions sell di®erentiated
units of labor in a monopolistic competitive environment with a Calvo type scheme. When
unions receive positive signals, they are allowed to re-optimize wages; otherwise they adjust
wages indexing them to past in°ation. Finally, pro¯ts generated from the imperfectly
competitive intermediate goods and the labor markets are redistributed to households. The
nominal interest rate is controlled by a monetary authority who set it in reaction to in°ation,
output gap and real balances.
The equations we employ can be derived from ¯rst principles - optimizing and forward
looking consumers and ¯rms and general equilibrium considerations. Since derivations of
this type exist in the literature (see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003) and Ireland (2004)),
we simply present the optimality conditions and highlight how they link to the objective
5functions and the constraints of the agents. The system in log-linear form is:
!1µt = ¡ct + hct¡1 ¡ !2mt + !2et (1)
!3lt = µt + wHH
t (2)
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where variables with time subscript are log deviation from the steady state, and vari-
ables without are variables at the steady state. Equation (1)-(4) and (12)-(14) are derived
from the household optimality conditions, where the !'s are convolutions of steady states
values and parameters that capture the curvature of the utility function. In particular,
!1 = ¡ Uc
CUcc, !2 = mUcm
CUcc , !3 = ¡LVLL
VL , !4 = ¡mUmm
Um and !5 = ¡CUmc
Um . Equation (1)
relates the marginal utility of consumption, µt, to current consumption, ct, past consump-
tion (controlled by a degree of habit, h), real balances, mt, and a money demand shock,
et. When preferences are separable in real balances and consumption,
@2U(c;m)
@C@m = 0 so that
!2 = 0 and !5 = 0 and real balances do not enter in the Euler equation. Unions pay a
wage, wHH
t , constant across households (HH), which re°ects the marginal rate of substi-
tution between working, lt, and consumption, see equation (2). Equation (3) is a money
demand equation which depends on current and past consumption, the nominal interest
rate, rt, and a preference disturbance, ²b
t. Current capital services, ks
t, are a function of the
6capital installed in the previous period, kt¡1, and the degree of capital utilization, zt (see
equation (5)). Household cost minimization implies that the degree of capital utilization is
a positive function of the rental rate of capital, as in equation (4). Equation (6) relates the
capital per worker to the cost of capital, rk
t , and of labor, wt. In equation (7) the marginal
cost, mct is determined by the real cost of the two factors in production, rk
t and wt, with
weights given by their respective share in production, net of the total factor productivity
disturbance, ²a
t. Final output, yt, is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function
(see equation (8)), where ª captures ¯xed cost in production, and ® is the capital share.
Total output is absorbed by exogenous government spending, ²
g
t, by investment, it, by con-
sumption, ct, and by the capital utilization cost, zt (see equation (9)). New installed capital
is formed by the °ows of investment and the net of depreciation old capital, (1¡±)kt¡1, see
equation (10). The capital accumulation equation is hit by the investment-speci¯c technol-
ogy disturbance ²i
t. Equation (11) represents a policy rule. The speci¯cation is standard
in the ¯rst three terms, re°ecting an interest rate smoothing desire and the wish to re-
spond to °uctuations in the output and in°ation. We allow the policy rule to depend on
the growth rate of nominal balances in order to mimic concerns that Central Banks had
over monetary aggregates for part of the sample and let ¸m ¸ 0. The disturbance to this
equation represents a monetary policy shock which is, by construction, orthogonal to the
other structural disturbances. The Euler equation, (12), controls the dynamics of consump-
tion and real balances, where current consumption and money balances depend on their
expected values and the ex-ante real interest rate, rt ¡ Et¼t+1. Equation (13) is the Q
equation that gives the value of capital stock, qt. It states that the current value of capital
stock depends positively on expected future value of the capital stock and on the real rental
rate on capital and negatively on the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (14) is an
investment equation: the current value of investment depends on past and expected future
value of investment and on current value of the stock of capital. Equation (15) gives the
dynamics of the real wage which moves sluggishly because of the wages stickiness and the
partial indexation assumption; wages responds to past and future expected real wage, to
the (current, past and expected) movements in in°ation. Real wage depends also on the
wage paid to HH by the union and on the wage markup, ²w
t , with slope kw =
(1¡»w)(1¡¯»w)
»w ,
where 1 ¡ »w is the probability of re-optimize wages. Equation (16) is a New Keynesian
Phillips curve: current in°ation depends positively on past and expected in°ation, and on
marginal costs. This equation is hit by a price markup disturbance, ²
p
t and the slope is
kp =
(1¡»p)(1¡¯»p)
1+ip¯ , where ¯ is the time discount factor, »p is the probability of keeping
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t ¡ ln²w = ²w
t = ½w²w
t¡1 + ³w
t (wage markup) and ²r
t = ³r
t (monetary
policy shock), where the ³'s are normal i.i.d. shocks.
We assume that the investigator observes output, consumption, investment, hours worked,
real wages, real balances, the in°ation rate, the nominal interest rate. The sample goes from















































Figure 1: Data in logs. From top left, M2, hours worked, output, consumption, investment,
wages, in°ation and interest rate. A quadratic trend is removed from all series.
1959:1 to 2006:1 and the data is obtained from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. We stop at 2006 to maintain comparability with the existing literature
and this avoids headaches on how deal with the recent ¯nancial crisis episode. For real
balances we use real M2 (de°ated by the GDP de°ator). The in°ation rate is measured
by the growth rate of GDP de°ator, the nominal rate by the Federal Funds rate and real
variables are scaled by the civilian noninstitutional population (CNP16OV) to transform
them in per-capita terms. Despite these transformations, some series still display an up-
ward trends. We therefore separately eliminate it from their log using a simple quadratic
speci¯cation. While the resulting °uctuations display long period of oscillation, they are
overall stationary as the model assumes (see ¯gure 1).
As a referee has pointed out, one feasible alternative to the strategy we use to match
the data to the model's counterparts is to allow the cost push shocks to be non-stationary
8and remove the upward trend in output and real balances using a model consistent method.
We do not follow this approach for three reasons. First, when cost push shocks have a unit
root, output and real balances share the same trend, which is not the case with the available
data. Second, it is unclear whether all non-cyclical °uctuations can be safely attributed
to non-stationary technology shocks. For example, Chang et al. (2006) have recently ¯t
a model with non-stationary preference shocks to US data with good results. Third, the
data transformed with a model based trend still displays a clear non-stationary behavior
and this makes parameters estimates unreliable and the quality of the ¯t quite poor.
2.2 The prior and the estimation technique
The model (1)-(16) contains up to 38 parameters; 18 structural ones
´1 = (h;¼;¯;a0=a00;S00;»w;iw;²w;»p;ip;²p;¸r;¸y;¸m;¸¼;²g;±;®), 5 semi-structural ones ´2 =
(!1;!2;!3;!4;!5), and 15 auxiliary ones, ´3 = (½e;½b;½a;½i;½g;½w;½p;¾e;¾b;¾a;¾i;¾g;¾r;¾w;¾p).
Our exercise is geared to obtain posterior distributions of ´ = (´1;´2;´3) using loosely spec-
i¯ed but proper priors.
We assume univariate prior densities for each of the parameters even if, in principle,
there should be some correlation structure among the priors. Note that, since all the priors
are proper, posterior distributions are proper and various speci¯cations can be compared
with simple odd ratios. The prior shapes we use in our benchmark speci¯cation are relatively
standard (see table 1), and very similar to the ones used in Smets and Wouters (2007) but
with much larger prior standard deviations. We ¯x some parameters, time discount factor
¯ = 0:995, capital depreciation rate ± = 0:025, steady state government spending over
GDP ²g = 0:18, capital share ® = 0:3, steady state in°ation ¼ = 1:006 since they are not
identi¯able from the data we use.
The model can be solved with standard methods. Its solution has a state space format:
x1t+1 = A1(´)x1t + A2(´)³t+1 (17)
x2t = A3(´)x1t (18)










t ] and the matrices
Ai(´);i = 1;2;3 are complicated nonlinear functions of the ´'s.
Bayesian estimation of (17) and (18) is simple: given some ´, and a sample t;:::;T,
we compute the likelihood, denoted by f(y[t;T]j´), by means of the Kalman ¯lter and the
prediction error decomposition. Then, for any speci¯cation of the prior distribution, denoted
by g(´), the posterior distribution for the parameters is g(´jy[t;T]) =
g(´)f(y[t;T]j´)
f(y) . The
analytical computation of the posterior is impossible in our setup since the denominator of
9the expression, f(y), requires the integration of g(´)f(yTj´) with respect to ´, which is a
high dimensional vector. In order to obtain draws from the unknown posterior distribution
we use the following (Metropolis) algorithm:
1. Choose a ´0. Evaluate g(´0); use the Kalman ¯lter to evaluate the likelihood L(y[t;T]j´0).
2. For each i = 1;:::;38 set ´i = ´i¡1 with probability 1 ¡ p and ´i = ´¤
i with probability
p, where ´¤






3. Repeat steps 1. and 2. ¹ L + L times and keep the last L draws.
At the end of the routine one has L draws to conduct the structural analysis.
Two important issues concern the convergence of simulated draws, that is, what is the
size of ¹ L, and the acceptance rate. We set the number of iteration to 500,000, checked
for convergence using the cumulative sum of the draws (CUMSUM) statistics and found
that convergence is achieved typically after 200000 draws. For inference we discard the ¯rst
half of the chain an keep one every 250 draws, so that we remove the correlation among
draws and have 1000 draws from the posterior distribution to work with. To get reasonable
acceptance rates, it is important to properly select the variance of vi. If the acceptance
rate is "too small" the chain will not visit the parameter space in a reasonable number of
iterations. If it is too high, the chain will not stay long enough in the high probability
regions. We set the variance of vi to target an acceptance rate in the range 20-40 percent.
The chosen prior shape re°ects the restrictions on the support of the parameter space.
Various parameterizations of the Beta distributions were tried and results are, by and large,
insensitive to settings of the parameters controlling the location of these distributions.
Finally, the choice of prior distributions for the policy parameters implies that multiple
equilibria are unlikely to characterize the data.
2.3 A measure of ¯t and model comparisons
To assess the quality of our model's approximation to the data we have estimated a number
of interesting structural benchmarks. In the next section, we present the marginal likelihood
(ML) of our model and of alternative speci¯cations where e.g. parameter restrictions are
imposed, real balances play no role in the Euler equation, or nominal balances do not enter
the policy rule, or both. For each model Mi, we approximate L(y[t;T]jMi); the marginal
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i is such that (´i
l ¡ ¹ ´i)§i(´i
l ¡ ¹ ´i)02
p (ki), where Â2
p(ki) is the p quantile of a chi-
square distribution where ki is the number of parameters in model i.
To provide additional information on the success of the estimation process, we also
examine the properties of the structural residuals and compare moments of the endogenous
variables to those obtained from more unrestricted speci¯cations. Both statistics can tell
us something about speci¯cation problems of the model and therefore nicely complement
what marginal likelihood comparisons give us.
3 Full sample estimation and speci¯cation searches
We start estimating the model for the full sample 1959:1-2006:1. We are interested in
verifying that it ¯ts the data reasonably well and, therefore, can be used to undertake the
type of analysis we care about; and in examining whether the model's parameterizations
can be simpli¯ed and certain speci¯cation choices matter for the results. Table 1 presents
the posterior medians and standard deviations for i) a speci¯cation which employs the
full set of parameters (UR), ii) a speci¯cation which employs a separable utility function,
!2 = !5 = 0, and no reaction of the interest rate to real balances, ¸m = 0, (R1), iii) a
speci¯cation which assumes no reaction of interest rate to real balances, ¸m = 0, (R2),and
iv) a speci¯cation which employs a separable utility function, !2 = !5 = 0, (R3).
A few aspects of the table deserve comments. First, priors and posteriors tend to have
di®erent locations, spreads and, in several cases, shape. Therefore, the sample appears to
be informative about the properties of many of the parameters. Second, the mean estimate
of !2 and !5 are positive and the posterior distribution is tight, both in an absolute sense
and relative to the prior. The elasticity of the three arguments in the utility function, i.e.
!1;!3 and !4, have the expected signs.
Third, the parameters controlling the backward looking components of the Euler equa-
tion and the Phillips curve are small (h and ip), smaller than those obtained, for example,
by Smets and Wouters (2003), Primiceri and Justiniano (2008), or others. One reason for
this is that the preliminary data transformation we use is di®erent from theirs.
Fourth, the coe±cients in the policy rule imply a relative mild smoothing desire and a
somewhat more aggressive response to in°ation and real balances. We experimented several
versions of the monetary policy rule, where for instance interest rate were allowed to react
to real balances (instead of real balances growth) or where the rection is contemporaneous
rather than lagged. The ¯t of these speci¯cations were poor and, in particular, the estimate
11UR R1 R2 R3
Prior Posterior
´ descr distr mean(sd) meadian(sd)
h habit in cons beta(14,6) 0.7(0.1) 0.35(0.06) 0.09(0.02) 0.37(0.01) 0.2(0.04)
!1 ¡Uc=(C ¤ Ucc) gam(4,0.25) 1(0.5) 0.87(0.11) 1.66(0.16) 0.07(0.02) 1.58(0.11)
!2 (m ¤ Ucm)=(UccC) gam(4,0.25) 1(0.5) 0.58(0.08) - 1.46(0.05) -
!3 ¡(l ¤ Vll)=Vl norm(2,0.5) 2(0.5) 0.54(0.07) 0.38(0.04) 1.45(0.03) 0.16(0.03)
!4 ¡(m ¤ Umm)=Um gam(4,0.25) 1(0.5) 0.09(0.05) 3.76(0.20) 0.12(0.01) 0.81(0.07)
!5 UmcC=Um gam(4,0.25) 1(0.5) 0.37(0.14) - 0.5(0.03) -
a
0=a
00 k utiliz beta(5.05,5.05) 0.5(0.15) 0.09(0.03) 0.07(0.03) 0.13(0.01) 0.35(0.06)
S
00 inv adj cost norm(1,1) 1(1) 3.74(0.606) 5.08(0.33) 2.12(0.08) 0.71(0.12)
»w wage stickiness beta(12,12) 0.5(0.1) 0.15(0.02) 0.04(0.01) 0.34(0.01) 0.21(0.01)
iw wage indexation beta(1,1) 0.5(0.3) 0.46(0.25) 0.13(0.11) 0.64(0.03) 0.63(0.07)
²w elast variety labor norm(10,2) 10(2) 10(2.25) 9.9(1.9) 12.9(0.87) 11.6(0.76)
»p price stickiness beta(12,12) 0.5(0.1) 0.93(0.01) 0.44(0.08) 0.44(0.02) 0.87(0.01)
ip price indexation beta(1,1) 0.5(0.3) 0.04(0.05) 0.08(0.09) 0.08(0.01) 0.01(0.01)
²p elast variety goods norm(10,2) 10(2) 10.8(1.76) 10.1(0.48) 12.5(0.65) 9.5(2.3)
¸r MP autoregressive beta(10,2) 0.8(0.1) 0.79(0.04) 0.8(0.04) 0.92(0.02) 0.8(0.04)
¸y MP resp to gdp norm(0.15,0.05) 0.15(0.05) 0.13(0.01) 0.12(0.011) 0.14(0.01) 0.14(0.01)
¸m MP resp to money norm(0.3,1) 0.3(1) 2.91(0.12) - - 2.9(0.31)
¸¼ MP resp to in°ation norm(2,1) 2(1) 6.48(0.44) 6.42(0.62) 5.04(0.01) 5.27(0.31)
½e AR money demand beta(2.62,2.62) 0.5(0.2) 0.95(0.01) 0.98(0.01) 0.98(0.02) 0.97(0.01)
½b AR preference beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.83(0.03) 0.84(0.03) 0.83(0.02) 0.83(0.03)
½a AR technology beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.98(0.01) 0.94(0.01) 0.86(0.02) 0.80(0.03)
½i AR investment beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.71(0.05) 0.24(0.03) 0.70(0.02) 0.91(0.02)
½g AR government beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.94(0.01) 0.92(0.01) 0.88(0.02) 0.90(0.02)
½w AR wage markup beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.96(0.01) 0.96(0.01) 0.92(0.002) 0.76(0.03)
½p AR price markup beta(2.6,2.6) 0.5(0.2) 0.87(0.03) 0.92(0.01) 0.97(0.001) 0.78(0.024)
¾e SD money demand igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.015(0.002) 0.020(0.002) 0.012(0.001) 0.007(0.001)
¾b SD preference igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.012(0.001) 0.012(0.001) 0.012(0.000) 0.012(0.001)
¾a SD technology igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.009(0.000) 0.009(0.000) 0.009(0.001) 0.009(0.000)
¾i SD investment igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.043(0.007) 0.100(0.008) 0.024(0.003) 0.007(0.001)
¾g SD government igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.034(0.002) 0.034(0.002) 0.033(0.001) 0.034(0.002)
¾r SD monetary policy igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.033(0.002) 0.031(0.003) 0.026(0.001) 0.031(0.003)
¾w SD wage markup igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.007(0.001) 0.007(0.000) 0.008(0.001) 0.005(0.000)
¾p SD price markup igam(3,0.02) 0.01(0.01) 0.034(0.006) 0.016(0.001) 0.016(0.001) 0.030(0.003)
p ML
0.1 -113.89 -541.64 -453.56 -120.03
0.3 -112.79 -540.47 -452.46 -118.92
0.5 -112.25 -539.88 -451.94 -118.39
0.7 -111.92 -539.53 -451.59 -118.01
0.9 -104.92 -539.08 -451.24 -117.57
ar 32.05 33.93 49.33 40.55
Table 1: Paramters description, priors, posteriors statistics, marginal likelihoods (ML) and
acceptance rate (ar) for the four speci¯cations.
12of the autoregressive coe±cient of the Taylor rule was close to zero making monetary policy
residuals highly serially autocorrelated. The rule we use has two importat features which
turns out ot be important in estimation: it makes the relationship between interest rate
and the right hand side variables dynamic; money growth enters the rule. To gain insights
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Figure 2: Impulse responses. Form top to bottom, TFP, Investment, Preference, Money
Demand, Government, Monetary Policy. Solid (blue) line full model, dotted (red) line
model with !2 = !5 = ¸m = 0.
for the plausibility of the estimates, it is interesting to analyze the transmission mechanism
of shocks and the decomposition of the variance implied by the full and restricted models.
Figure 2 reports the responses of interest rate, in°ation, real balances and GDP to impulse in
supply (technology, investment) and demand (preference, money demand and government)
shocks and monetary policy. The dynamics induced by supply shocks are in line with those
of Semts and Wouters (2007), where for example following a positive TFP shock output
increases while in°ation and in the interest rate drop. An investment shock produces similar
co-movements of the interest rate, the in°ation and GDP and induces a drop in money
demand. These dynamics are roughly similar in models where mony matters and model
where money does not matter. The transmission of a monetary policy shock is instead
di®erent. In the basline model, a monetary policy tightening (positive monetary policy
shock) increases the interest rate and makes M2 supply drop, generating a liquidity e®ect.
13As a results, the economy contracts, and output and in°ation decrease. All the responses
display some inertia and the response of GDP is quite sluggish.
When money does not matter, the correlation between interest rate and money condi-
tional on monetary policy shocks is positive, implying that contractionary monetary policy
generates a signi¯cant increase of the interest rate and of the money supply. Moreover,
while money demand shocks have a non-negligible impact on nominal and real variables in
the baseline model, in the restricted speci¯cation all these e®etcs are forced to zero and are
captured by other shocks.
UR !2 = !5 = ¸m = 0 ¸m = 0 !2 = !5 = 0
k¡step ahead 8 16 40 8 16 40 8 16 40 8 16 40
GDP
Money Shock 24.7 14.9 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 14.2 0.7
Preference 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0
Technology 21.9 61.2 82.2 59.4 58.9 48.3 19.5 3.2 0.0 20.1 0.6 3.7
Investment 17.1 1.9 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 3.4 3.9 0.1 50.2 57.4 90.0
Government 6.3 3.0 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 21.3 0.8
Monetary Policy 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.1
Wage Markup 5.1 11.2 0.4 14.3 19.3 41.7 17.7 8.6 0.8 10.5 1.2 1.5
Price Markup 23.6 7.8 3.0 25.6 21.5 10.0 59.4 84.2 99.1 17.7 1.9 3.3
In°ation
Money Shock 2.3 15.2 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 46.4 72.5
Preference 2.8 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 7.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Technology 22.2 0.5 7.8 59.7 59.2 48.9 18.4 3.3 0.0 15.5 1.5 1.5
Investment 51.7 66.4 16.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 3.1 3.9 0.1 48.3 50.5 24.0
Government 1.3 6.0 3.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1
Monetary Policy 6.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Wage Markup 0.2 10.1 32.4 14.4 19.4 40.6 16.6 8.8 0.9 11.4 0.5 0.6
Price Markup 13.3 1.1 28.2 24.6 21.1 10.5 54.5 83.5 99.0 6.1 0.5 1.3
Table 2: k¡step ahead forecast error for GDP and In°ation
Table 2 presents the k¡step ahead forecast error for GDP and in°ation in terms of
structural shocks. The table contains several results. First, while in the unrestricted spec-
i¯cation the money demand shock contributes signi¯cantly to the volatility of GDP and
in°ation at horizons from 2 until 10 years, in the restricted speci¯cations money demand
shocks play a negligible role. In particular, they do not contribute to explain GDP forecast
error at any horizons, and they explain a small portion of the volatility of in°ation as long
as ¸m 6= 0. Second, while markup shocks have some role in explain GDP volatility at short
horizons, their impact tend to disappear in the long run, and supply shocks, i.e. technology
shocks, appear to be the predominant source of GDP °uctuations. In line with Smets and
14Wouter (2007), in the most restricted speci¯cation !2 = !5 = ¸m = 0 wage markup shocks
counterintuively explain a large portion of the volatility of GDP at business cycles frequen-
cies. In sum, the dynamics described by the unrestricted and the restricted speci¯cations
di®er substantially, in particular as far as the transmission of monetary policy shocks and
the share of the variance of output and in°ation attributed to shocks. Given the focus of
the investigation, models where money is not allowed to matter seem unable to capture the
main features of the data.
It is also instructive to inspect the time path of the estimated residuals to check for
interesting pattern left unexplained in the estimation. Figure 3 plots the smoothed residu-
als obtained with the unrestricted speci¯cation. It is clear that during the 1970's, the US
economy experienced a series of negative monetary policy shocks while at the beginning of
the 80's monetary policy is characterized by a series of positive shocks. Thus the path of
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Figure 3: Residuals for the unrestricted speci¯cation. From top left, money demand, pref-
erence, technology, investment, government, monetary, price markup, wage markup.
policy shock implies that monetary policy was accommodative for most of the 1970s and
became much tighter later on. Interestingly, the model also predicts a sequence of negative
interest shocks just after 2001. While the monetary policy residuals in the restricted speci¯-
cations are similar, see ¯gure 4, the implied path displays a more pronounced autoregressive
component and residuals tend to be asymmetric and skewed towards negative values.
Table 1 which reports the marginal likelihood of each model con¯rms previous conclu-
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Figure 4: Monetary Policy residuals across speci¯cations.
sions. For a wide range of p-values, the unrestricted speci¯cation is superior to all other
structural alternatives we considered. Thus allowing real balances to play a role and spec-
ifying a policy rule which depends, among other things, on the growth rate of nominal
balances gives an important advantage in terms of model's ¯t and properties of the residu-
als. Hopefully, this superiority will also help in providing a better economic interpretation
of the evidence.
4 In°ation dynamics
There is substantial controversy in the literature regarding the role that monetary policy
had in shaping the dynamics of US in°ation over the last forty years. Conditional on the
model, we can shed some light on the issue by analyzing the time pro¯le of the estimated
autocovariance function of in°ation, by measuring the contribution of policy shocks to the
changes, and by interpreting the evolution of these statistics in terms of changes in the
parameters of the model.
Roberts (2006) and Cecchetti et al. (2007) have studied, by way of stochastic simulations
and/or standard sensitivity analysis, how changes in the parameters of a small scale model
where money plays no role a®ect in°ation variability and persistence. Both consider a
somewhat hybrid model, where the Euler equation is ad-hoc, a time varying in°ation target
enters the policy rule and the policy shock is persistent. Roberts ¯nds that changes in
16the policy parameters can account for the fall in the variance of in°ation but not on its
persistence. Cecchetti et al. ¯nd that two parameters are crucial: the degree of indexation
in the Phillips curve and the variance of the policy shocks. In particular, only a considerable
fall in the indexation parameter is capable of explaining the absolute fall in persistence that
researchers have documented. In addition, when indexation is low, a fall in the variance of
the policy shocks may also decrease in°ation persistence.
The analysis we conduct has two main di®erences with these papers. First, contrary to
these authors, we examine the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the evolution of the
variability and persistence of in°ation, (much in the same spirit as Gambetti et al. (2008)
but using a structural model rather than a VAR) and examine how the evolution of certain
parameter estimates changed the contribution of monetary policy shocks. To do this, let
xt = [x1t;x2t]0 and represent the solution of the model as xt+1 = W1(´)xt+W2(´)³t+1. Then
var(xt) = §x solves §x = W1(´)§xW1(´)0 + W2(´)§³W2(´)0 and ACF(1)(xt) = W1(´)§x,
where §³ is the covariance matrix of the shocks and ACF(1) the ¯rst autocovariance coe±-
cient. Since monetary shocks are uncorrelated with the other disturbances, the contribution
of monetary shocks to these statistics can be computed by replacing §³ with a matrix which
is zero everywhere except in the diagonal position corresponding to the monetary shocks.
As estimates of ´ change over time, we can assess how the contribution of monetary shocks
to these statistics has changed and attribute the variations to particular parameters.
Second, while one would be tempted to present a graph showing how in°ation dynamics
change when ´ varies within a reasonable range, keeping all the other parameters ¯xed
at some value (for example, those estimated in the ¯rst column of table 1), one should
be aware that such a graph would be meaningless in our context, since the correlation
structure of estimates implies that the e®ect of changes in some parameters can not be
measured independently of the others. To address the questions of interest we have instead
estimated a version of the model where some parameters are ¯xed on many overlapping
samples. We started from the sample [1959:1, 1976:1] and repeated estimation moving
the starting date by two year, while keeping the size of the sample constant to 17 years.
Keeping a ¯xed window size is necessary to eliminate di®erences produced by di®erent
precision of the estimates. The last subsample is [1989:1-2006:1], so that we produce 16
posterior distributions for the parameters. Since the ¯nal sample roughly corresponds to
Greenspan's tenure, we can compare the estimated stance of monetary policy in the 1990's,
where in°ation was low, with the one of the 1970's, where in°ation was high.
Given the large number of parameters involved (39) and the sample length (65), we have
decided to reduce the number of parameters to estimate and focus on those which are of
17interest. Thus, in each estimation window, we keep ¯xed the time discount factor ¯ = 0:995,
the capital depreciation rate ± = 0:025, the steady state government spending over GDP
²g = 0:18, the capital share ® = 0:3, the steady state in°ation ¼ = 1:006. Moreover, we
set the two elasticities in the labor and intermediate good markets to 13. The remaining
parameters are estimated.
4.1 The volatility and the persistence of in°ation
It is well documented in the literature that the times series properties of US in°ation have
changed over time (see e.g. Stock and Watson (2002)). Is the model able to capture these
facts? What is the contribution of policy shocks to these changes? Figure 5 presents
statistics recursevely computed from the data, the estimates of these statistics obtained in
the model and the statistics produced if only one type of shocks - technology shocks (TFP
and investment), monetary policy shocks (money demand shocks are not reported here since
are not important) and real demand shocks (government spending and preference)- were
present. We measure volatility in the model using the population unconditional variance
and persistence using the population ¯rst order autocorrelation coe±cient obtained using
the solution of the model and posterior mean estimates of the parameters in each sample.
The statistics in the data show important time variations: for example, there is a large
drop in volatility when the samples exclude the early 1970s , while the fall persistence is
evident only if windows including the 1980 and the 1990s are considered. Interestingly,
after that in°ation persistence starts rising again. While the model is able to track quite
well the volatility dynamics, it fails to capture the drop in persistence experienced in the
sample including the 80s and 90s. Notice however, the fall in in°ation persistence is neither
smooth nor long-lived and the same pattern is maintained if the windows change in size of
if the sample is split in less overlapping windows.
The changes in volatility and presistence could be due to di®erent causes. Interestingly,
monetary policy shocks seem to have a role in shaping the dynamics of in°ation volatility and
appear to be responsible in part for the decrease observed in the latest samples. Moreover,
they track pretty well the rise and fall of volatility over time. However, other shocks appear
to be responsible for the evolution of the autocovariance function of in°ation. Technology
shocks, for example, a®ect in°ation volatility and persistence mainly at the beginning of
the sample and their importance is falling over time. Oil shocks which materialized at the
end of the 70s are captured here as negative supply shocks, and contribute to the in°ation
volatility at the beginning of the sample. Real demand shocks matter also for the dynamics























































Figure 5: Variance (left) and persistence (right) of In°ation. Dotted line data, dashed line
full model, solid line model only with technology shocks (TFP and investment) ¯rst row,
monetary policy shocks second row and real demand shocks (preference and government)
las row.
4.2 The transmission of monetary policy shocks
It is interesting to examine how the variations observed in ¯gure 5 decompose into variations
in the transmission of policy shocks over time (for a given variance of the shocks) and
variations in the volatility of policy shocks. Gambetti et. al. (2008) have shown, in the
context of a SVAR with time varying coe±cients, that there are variations in the size and
the shape of the responses to monetary shocks and in the variances of these shocks. What
does our structural analysis tell us about this issue? Figure 6 presents the responses to
a normalized monetary policy shock in the 16 samples we have considered. Hence, the
variations it displays only re°ect changes in the structural parameters of the model and not
changes in the variance of the policy shocks (these will be analyzed later on).
Overall, the shape of the responses to policy shock has not changed much over time:
when monetary policy is tight, in°ation and output fall. Quantitatively, the impact e®ect
of monetary shocks is somewhat reduced over time.
One other features of the responses deserve some comment: the largest responses are all
instantaneous. This may appear surprising relative to the conventional VAR wisdom. One


























Figure 6: Impulse response of output and in°ation to a positive monetary shocks.
inconsistent with the theory embedded in models like the one we use and that when the
restrictions that theory imposes are used, no strong delayed response typically appears (see
Canova and De Nicolo' (2002)). Nevertheless, it is important to note that large delayed
e®ects in the responses to monetary shocks are possible only if the model features interesting
higher order dynamics. Because the price indexation parameter and the habit parameter are
estimated to be relatively small, and no other arti¯cial delays are introduced, the conditional
dynamics of our model are similar to those of a VAR(1).
4.3 The rise and fall in the level of in°ation
One crucial event we would like our model to explain is the rise in the level of in°ation in
the 1970s and the subsequent fall in the 1980s. The conventional wisdom attributes these
ups and downs to a changing monetary stance, which was lax in the 1970s and became tight
in the 1980s. The analysis of the previous subsections is inconclusive since the statistics we
report are not designed to shed light on this issue. Here we present the results of a historical
decomposition exercise where we take mean posterior estimates of the parameters in four
samples (1961-1978, 1965-1982, 1967-1984, 1969-1986), project the implied path of in°ation
out-of-sample, and ask whether and by how much policy shocks account for the deviation









Info up to 78
Info up to 82
Info up to 84
Info up to 86
Figure 7: The rise and fall of in°ation
between the actual and the projected path. Formally, we decompose in°ation in terms of
realized monetary policy shocks,









where S is a selection matrix that picks in°ation out of the vector of observable variables,
¹ ´T is the mean posterior estimate using the information up to T. f^ ³r
mgT
m=1 is the set of
realized monetary policy shocks in the sample considered and ^ ³
y
m = [0;0;0;0;0; ^ ³r
m;0;0].
Then, we project in°ation out of sample conditional on time T information,
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Figure 7, which presents the actual (demeaned) and the counterfactual in°ation paths,
displays interesting aspects. The sequence of policy shocks that materialized after 1978:1
would have implied an increase in the level of in°ation, given the parameter estimates we
obtain. Hence, monetary policy was rather accommodative in these periods. This pattern
seems to change after 1982:1. The sequence of policy shocks that materialized after that
date would have implied a considerable decline in the level of in°ation, given parameter
estimates. Hence, monetary policy had become quite restrictive after this date and, if
only policy shocks would have been present, in°ation would have been very low during the
21following 3 years, when information up to 1984:4 is used. Thus, policy shocks quantitatively
predict movements in the actual level of in°ation, and can account for the direction of the
changes over the periods we consider.
How does one reconcile the evidence of ¯gures 5 and 7? Figure 5 was concerned with
the in-sample explanatory power of policy shocks for volatility and persistence. Figure 7 is
instead concerned with the out-of-sample explanatory power of these shocks for the level
of in°ation in the next three years. Therefore, the fact that these shocks may have some
room in explaining changes in the autocovariance function of in°ation does not imply the
fact that policy shocks are important to explain changes in the level of in°ation.
4.4 Bringing the shocks of the 70s in the Greenspan era
What would have happened to in°ation if we could bring the shocks of the 70s during the
`Great Moderation' era? Would we still observe a °at and low volatile pattern of in°ation?
Usually, counterfactuals on monetary policy are performed by moving the monetary policy
of Alan Greenspan during the oil crisis, which means asking whether the sole monetary
policy would have been able to stabilize the economy given the intense shocks and the
economic structure of the 70s. Here, we take a di®erent stand and ask less to monetary
policy. We would like to know whether the entire structure of the US economy, private and
public sectors as a hole, would be able to absorb and mitigate the realized innovations of
the 70s.
More precisely, we compute the realized innovations of the sample that goes from 1967q1
to 1984q1 from b ³70
t+1 = W¡1
2 (´70)(xt+1 ¡W1(´70)xt), where ´70 is the mean of the posterior
distribution of the sample [1967q1 ¡ 1984q1]. We then simulate implied paths for in°ation
assuming that the economy evolves according to the estimated structure during the 90s and
it is feeded with the shocks of the 70s, i.e. xs
t+1 = W1(´90)xs
t + W2(´90)b ³70
t+1 where ´90 is
the mean of the posterior distribution of the sample [1987q1 ¡ 2006q1]. We simulate data
under three assumption about the monetary policy residuals: (a) a totally passive monetary
policy intervention, i.e. monetary policy residuals set to zero, (b) the 70s monetary policy
intervention, i.e. monetary policy residuals of the 70s, (c) the Greenspan monetary policy
intervention, i.e. monetary policy residuals of the 90s.
Figure 8 plots the impled paths under the three di®erent assumptions and the actual
path of in°ation during the `Great Moderation' period. The ¯gure suggests that regardless
on the assumption about the monetary policy residuals the implied paths for in°ation
display °uctuations considerably more volatile and persistent than actual ones of the 90's.
This means that neither the monetary policy of Alan Greenspan neither the economic
















Figure 8: Implied paths of in°ation with the shocks of the 70's.
structure of the 90's would be able to cope with the deep shocks of the 70's. This result
provides additional evidence that the sources of great moderation arise from di®erences in
the intensity of the shocks rather than policy actions. However, it is important to stress
that we do not use (and know) the monetary policy interventions (residuals) that Alan
Greenspan would have done if he knew that he was facing the the shocks of the 70's (i.e.
the distribution of the structural shocks of the 70's). While it would be the correct set of
monetary policy residuals to work with, it is impossible to carve them out from the data.
4.5 Summary
The analysis of this section has shown that the model captures the time pro¯le of in°ation
volatility quite well and attributes part of the changes to monetary policy shocks. Neverthe-
less, policy shocks do not have a predominant role in the decline: in fact, the transmission
of policy disturbances is broadly unchanged over time. Hence, changes in the structural
parameters somewhat average out and do not amplify changes in the variance of the mon-
etary shocks. On the other hand, the rise and fall in the level of in°ation appears to be
linked to the sign and, to some extent, the magnitude of realized policy shocks. Absent
these shocks the ups and downs of in°ation would have been much smaller. Finally, the
`Great Moderation' episode seems to be more likely linked with the intensity of the shocks
rather then changes in the monetary policy behavior. Overall, the evidence suggests that
changes in the transmission of shocks other than policy disturbances are as or more impor-
23tant in explaining the changes in the autocovariance function of in°ation. To understand
what factors may have given these shocks an important role, we next turn to examine the
parameter estimates we obtain in di®erent samples.
5 Rolling parameter estimates
Figure 9 presents the evolution of the posterior mean of interesting (functions of the) pa-
rameters over di®erent samples. For the sake of readability, we omit posterior credible sets
- since they are relatively tight, the variations we present are typically a-posteriori signi¯-















































































Figure 9: Rolling parameter estimates.
the analysis of Clarida et al. (2000), the ¯gure shows that short run policy coe±cient on
in°ation increases in the samples which mainly include the 1980s. Interestingly, and consis-
tent with the structural VAR evidence of Canova and Gambetti (2009), the posterior mean
estimate falls somewhat in the latest samples. Hence, while Greenspan was tougher than
24Burns in ¯ghting in°ation, the posterior distributions which include only the 1990s and
the beginning of the 2000s show a reduced short run concern for in°ation. This contrasts
with the dynamics displayed by the long run coe±cient on nominal variables (computed
as (1 ¡ ¸r)¡1(¸¼ + ¸m)). Here a clear decreasing pattern emerges with a peak located in
the beginning of the sample. Note that the coe±cient on the output (not shown here) is
stable over time and shows no sign of increase in correspondence to the drop in the long
run coe±cient of nominal aggregates.
The posterior mean of the standard deviation of the policy shock shows some variations
over time. As convectional wisdom suggests there is a decrease (to 0.035 from 0.025) in
the samples from (1959-1976) to (1969-1986) but this decrease is reversed in the next few
samples. This evidence is a bit surprising, but it is in line with the evidence produced by the
Markov switching approach of Sims and Zha (2006), and the recursive analysis of Gambetti
et al. (2008). It is worth mentioning that decreasing the length of the windows does not
change this pattern: the increase present in the last few years of the sample is consistent
with the more active role that the Fed has taken since 2001.
There are changes also in the posterior mean of other important parameters. For exam-
ple, there are shifts in responsiveness of the output to real balances (see the real balance
trade-o®, !2=!1) and in the responsiveness of in°ation to the marginal cost (Phillips curve
trade-o®). The fact that the real balance tradeo® is increasing, coupled with a volatile but
overall constant Phillips curve tradeo®, indicates that real balances may have played di®er-
ent roles at di®erent points in time. For example it is possible that real balances behaved
as close proxies of consumer purchasing power in the early samples while they proxy for
segmented asset markets in later samples (see e.g. Alvarez and Lippi, (2009)).
Interestingly, many other standard deviations display signi¯cant time variations. For
instance, the standard deviations of government spending, preference and money demand
shocks increased at the beginning of the samples, and then steadily decreased, giving support
to the idea that many structural shocks have been less intense in the latter part of the
sample, see e.g. Gali and Gambetti (2009).
In sum, the parameter changes we describe can explain why shocks other than monetary
policy disturbances have an important role in explaining the variations in the volatility of
in°ation documented in ¯gure 5. It is because output changes in response to these shocks
are larger, because changes in output are proportionally more important to explain in°ation
changes (and because the size of these shocks fell) that we see a large decline in the volatility
of in°ation over time.
256 Conclusions
This paper examines the contribution of policy shocks to the dynamics of in°ation using a
medium scale structural model estimated with US post-WWII data and Bayesian techniques
over rolling samples. The model belongs to the class of New-Keynesian structures that have
been extensively used in the literature but explicitly allows money to play a role. Bayesian
techniques are preferable to standard likelihood methods or to indirect inference (impulse
response matching) exercises, because the model we consider is a false description of the
DGP of the data and misspeci¯cation may be important. We show that our approach
delivers interesting estimates of the structural parameters when priors are broadly non-
informative and the policy reaction function appropriately chosen. We also demonstrate
that the model ¯ts the data reasonably well and that alternative structural speci¯cations
produce lower marginal likelihoods and fail to capture important aspects of the data.
Our model captures the fall in in°ation volatility and attributes a portion of the changes
to monetary policy shocks. We detect level but not shape di®erences in the transmission of
policy shocks which tend to make in°ation and real balances somewhat less reactive to policy
disturbances as time went by. Finally, variations in the level of in°ation are qualitatively
related to policy shocks: had those been absent, the rise of the 1970s and the fall of 1980s
would have been much more modest.
A number of structural changes drive these results. We ¯nd support for the conjecture
that the Fed had a much stronger short run "dislike" for in°ation in later samples but
also notice that the long run coe±cient on nominal variables has been steadily decreasing.
In agreement with the good luck hypothesis, we detect variations in the posterior mean
estimate of the variance of the policy shocks. Nevertheless, the variations we discover are
typically reversed over time. Perhaps surprisingly, we ¯nd that these variations do not
change very much the way monetary shocks are transmitted to the economy.
In sum, a combination of causes is responsible for the changes in the level and the
autocovariance function of US in°ation over the last forty years: changes in the variance
of the shocks, in the parameters regulating the private sector and in the policy rule all
more or less contributed to explain why in°ation rose and fell and why in°ation variability
subsided. These conclusions are rather di®erent than those present in the literature, with
the exception of Gambetti et. al. (2008).
There are a number of ways our analysis can be extended. For example, the estimation
approach we employ treats expectations as latent variables. However, measures of output
and in°ation expectations, do exist in the literature. While these proxies are probably
26contaminated by measurement error, it would be interesting to see whether they provide
additional or contrasting information about the issues at stake. Similarly, it is important to
consider additional statistics to the evaluation process: while the model seems by and large
well misspeci¯ed, it may not capture the time pro¯le of the dynamics of a particular variable
well. Finally, the use of alternative rolling estimation techniques, such as those employed
by Kapetanios and Yates (2008), can help us to understand whether the conclusions are
robust also along this dimension. We leave all these extensions for future research.
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29A SW(2007) Model with non separable utility function
In this section, we present some of the assumptions about preferences and technology of the
the model of Smets and Wouters (2007), henceforth SW. Since many of the derivations are
identical to SW, we only emphasize those that deviates from their setup. Household (HH)




;Lt) = U(Ct ¡ hCt¡1;
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where DivP and DivL are dividends paid by the intermediate sector ¯rms and labor unions.
As in SW, labor unions pay a ¯xed wage to HH, WHH, di®erentiate HH labor and sell it
to labor packers in a monopolistic competitive environment (pro¯ts are redistributed to
HH in terms of dividends). Labor packers sell then "packed" labor to intermediate sector
¯rms in a perfectly competitive market. The second constraint that HH faces is the capital
accumulation law of motion, i.e.









The production side and the wage setting is identical to SW. Also the government budget














By adding money in the government budget constraint, the feasibility constrain is obtained
simply by integrating across HH and adding gov't BC, and it is the same as SW, i.e.
Gt + Ct + It + a(Zt)Kt¡1 = Yt
In steady state, SW assume that S(1) = 0, S0(1) = 0, Z = 1 and a(Z) = a(1) = 0.






1¡®, L=Y = 1¡®
w , K=Y = ®
1=¯¡1+±, ª = (K=Y )®(L=Y )1¡®.
From the First Order Conditions (FOC) of the HH (taking the derivative of the objective





30Rewrite the RHS of the latter as
Uc(e Ct; e mt) = Uc(t)
where e Ct = Ct ¡ hCt¡1 and e mt = mt
et and mt = Mt











































































The log linearized version of the FOC with respect to consumption is
UccCb ct ¡ hUccCb ct¡1 + Ucmmb mt ¡ Ucmmb et = µb µt
From the steady state equation we have that µ = Uc, the latter can be rewritten as
!1b µt = ¡b ct + hb ct¡1 ¡ !2 b mt + !2b et
where!1 = ¡ Uc
CUcc and !2 = mUcm
CUcc .
From the FOC of the HH (taking the derivative w.r.t. Lt), we obtain
VL(Lt) = ¡µtWHH
t =Pt = ¡µtwHH
t
where WHH
t is the wage paid by the Unions to the household. At the steady state,
VL = ¡µWHH=P
31The log linear version of the FOC w.r.t. Lt is
VLLLb lt = ¡µwHHb µt ¡ µwHH b wHH
t
!3b lt = b µt + b wHH
t
where !3 = ¡VLLL
VL .
















































b µt + µ
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dividing for Um we get
UmcC
Um

























where !5 = ¡CUmc
Um and !4 = ¡mUmm
Um .
The remaining log linearized equations are derived similarly as in SW.


































































































































































































Figure 10: Impulse responses for the model with !2 = !5 = 0 and with ¸m = 0. Form top
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Figure 14: Rolling parameter estimates.
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